Delictual Liability for Damage Caused by Fully Autonomous Vehicles: The Estonian Perspective by Liivak, Taivo & Lahe, Janno
2018] T. Liivak, J. Lahe: Delictual Liability for Damage ... 49
DELICTUAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
CAUSED BY FULLY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES:
THE ESTONIAN PERSPECTIVE
by
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Self-driving vehicles have become a reality.  For instance,  in the summer of 2017,
self-driving  buses  carried  passengers  on a designated  route  in Estonia's  capital
Tallinn.  Regrettably,  traffic  accidents  involving  self-driving  vehicles  have  also
become a reality.  This article focuses on fully autonomous vehicles. The safe and
responsible  use  of fully  autonomous  vehicles  calls  for  appropriate  rules  and
an appropriate  allocation  of liability.  Above  all,  fully  autonomous  vehicles  pose
a challenge to the law of delict. The article seeks to establish, based on the example
of Estonian  law,  whether  the application  of delictual  liability  is  affected
by the autonomy of a vehicle and, if so, whether related differences are significant,
and whether the law of delict needs to be modified in the light thereof. The issues are
discussed primarily in the context of Estonian law, but parallels with German law
are drawn as well. The conclusions drawn are more or less universal and can be
taken into account also in other jurisdictions besides Estonia. The article analyses
liability for damage caused by fully autonomous vehicles under general delictual
liability, strict liability and product liability.
KEY WORDS
Autonomous Vehicles, Delictual Liability, Product Liability, Self-driving Vehicles,
Strict Liability
* taivo.liivak@ut.ee, Ph.D. candidate, Tartu University Law School, Estonia.
** janno.lahe@ut.ee, Professor of Law of Delict, Tartu University Law School, Estonia; Adviser
to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Estonia.
DOI 10.5817/MUJLT2018-1-3
50 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 12:1
1. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2017, passengers in Estonia's capital Tallinn were carried
by self-driving  buses  in the course  of a month-long  international  pilot
project.1 Although  the buses  rode  along  a short  route  separated  from
conventional traffic, the test period was a landmark for Estonia, indicating
that autonomous vehicles are becoming a reality.2 Such vehicles are being
developed  by many  established  manufacturers  as well  as new  market
participants  seeking  to disrupt  not  only  the transport  sector,  but  also
the ways in which vehicles are being manufactured.3
In technological terms, this article focuses on fully autonomous vehicles
(autonome  Fahrzeuge)4 where  all  persons  in the vehicle  are  merely
passengers.  Even  though  one  of the main  aims  of developing  fully
autonomous vehicles is to improve road safety, traffic accidents involving
fully autonomous vehicles cannot be precluded. On the one hand, the laws
of physics  simply  do  not  allow  for  halting  a vehicle  in an instant.
On the other hand, a fully autonomous vehicle may find itself in a so-called
dilemma  situation  where  it  must  “decide”  which  person  to harm  (for
instance, whether to drive off the road and into a tree or hit a child who has
run  onto  the road).5 This  so-called  decision  depends,  above  all,  on how
the software of the vehicle has been programmed.
In order  to ensure  the safe  and  responsible  use  of fully  autonomous
vehicles, appropriate rules and appropriate allocation of liability is crucial.6
Vehicles  driving  in the autonomous  mode  and  autonomous  test  vehicles
1 Government Office EU Secretariat.  (2017)  Driverless  buses  arrive  in Tallinn.  [press release]
14 July.  Available  from:  https://www.eu2017.ee/news/press-releases/driverless-buses-
arrive-tallinn [Accessed 30 May 2018].
2 In July 2017, the term “self-driving delivery robot” was added the Estonian Traffic Act (TA).
It  means  a partially  or fully  automated  or remotely  controlled  vehicle  which  moves
on wheels or another chassis that is in contact with the ground, which uses sensors, cameras
or other equipment for obtaining information on the surrounding environment and, based
on the obtained  information,  is  able  to move  partially  or fully  without  being  controlled
by a driver (TA § 2 clause 681). The user and the controlling of a self-driving delivery robot
was also defined (TA § 2 clauses 682–683).
3 See,  for  example,  Geistfeld,  M.  (2017)  A Roadmap for  Autonomous Vehicles:  State  Tort
Liability,  Automobile  Insurance,  and  Federal  Safety  Regulation.  California  Law  Review,
105(6), pp. 1615–1616.
4 For a brief overview of the levels of driving automation see Smith, B. W. (2013) SAE Levels
of Driving Automation.  [blog entry] 18 December. Available from: http://cyberlaw.stanford.
edu/blog/2013/12/sae-levels-driving-automation [Accessed 30 May 2018]; SAE International.
(2014) J3016. Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated
Driving Systems. Available from: https://web.archive.org/web/20170903105244/https://www.
sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2018].
5 For further information on the dilemma situation see Weber, P. (2016) Dilemmasituationen
beim autonomen Fahren. Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, (6), pp. 249–254.
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have  already  been  involved  in as well  as caused  numerous  accidents,
including those resulting in fatalities.7 However, these vehicles were merely
semi-autonomous.8 
When  a traffic  accident  occurs,  civil  liability  issues  arise.  This  article
analyses  delictual  liability  that  arises  or may  arise  from  damage  caused
by a fully autonomous vehicle.9 More specifically, the article seeks answers
to the following  questions:  is  the application  of delictual  liability  affected
by the fact  of whether  damage  has  been  caused  by a conventional  motor
vehicle or a fully autonomous vehicle; if so, are these differences significant;
and does the law of delict need to be modified as a result thereof?
These  issues  are  approached,  above  all,  from  the point  of view
of Estonian law of delict. At the same time, it is quite clear that analogous
questions can be raised in many legal systems. In more important matters,
comparisons  are  drawn with  the legal  rules,  case-law and legal  writings
of the Federal Republic of Germany as a legal system which was the main
role  model  for  drafting  Estonian  civil  law  following  the restoration
of Estonia’s  independence  in 1991.  The law  of delict  provisions
of the Estonian Law of Obligations Act (LOA)10 distinguish between general
6 Contissa, G. et al. (2013) Liability and automation: Issues and challenges for socio-technical
systems. Journal of Aerospace Operations, (2), pp. 79–98. Available from: https://pure.tue.nl/ws
/files/3915758/24573390365552.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2018].
7 See,  for  example,  Marshall,  A.  and  Davies,  A.  (2018)  Waymo's  Self-Driving  Car  Crash
in Arizona Revives Tough Questions. [online] Wired. Available from: https://www.wired.com/
story/waymo-crash-self-driving-google-arizona/  [Accessed  30  May  2018];  Hawkins,  A.  J.
(2018)  Uber ‘Likely’  not at Fault  in Deadly Self-Driving  Car Crash, Police Chief  Says.  [online]
The Verge.  Available  from:  https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/20/17142672/uber-deadly-
self-driving-car-crash-fault-police [Accessed 30 May 2018]; Weise, E. and Marsh, A. (2018)
Video  Shows  Google  Self-Driving  Van  Accident  in Arizona.  [online]  USA  Today,  5  May.
Available  from:  https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/05/04/google-self-driving-van-
involved-crash-arizona-driver-injured/582446002/  [Accessed  30  May  2018];  Nicola,  S.,
Behrmann, E. and Mawad, M. (2018)  It's a Good Thing Europe's Autonomous Car Testing Is
Slow. [online] Bloomberg. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-20/it-s-a-good-thing-europe-s-autonomous-car-testing-is-slow [Accessed 30 May 2018].
8 They all had a driver responsible for actively overseeing the behaviour of the vehicle and
taking over  control.  Because of problems with semi-autonomous driving,  manufacturers
such  as,  for  instance,  Ford and Google  have  decided  to skip  semi-autonomous  driving
altogether  and  aim straight  for  the highest  level  of autonomy.  See  Naughton,  K.  (2017)
Ford's  Dozing  Engineers  Side  with  Google  in Full  Autonomy  Push.  [online]  Bloomberg.
Available  from:  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-17/ford-s-dozing-
engineers-side-with-google-in-full-autonomy-push [Accessed 30 May 2018].
9 Of course,  there may be a contract  between the injured person and the person operating
a fully  autonomous  vehicle  under  which  damage  is  suffered  (e.g. contract  for  carriage
of passengers).  Where  damage  has  been  caused  by a breach  of a contractual  obligation,
the claim for damages (under Estonian law) must usually be filed on the basis of provisions
of contractual liability.
10 Law of Obligations  Act  (võlaõigusseadus)  2001.  SI  2001/81,  487.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State
Gazette). In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
510012018003/consolide [Accessed 30 May 2018].
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fault-based  delictual  liability  (§§ 1043–1055),  strict  liability  (§§ 1056–1060)
and liability for a defective product (§§ 1061–1067). This distinction largely
determines the structure of this article.  The possibility to bring a claim for
damages based on the provisions of strict liability or product liability does
not restrict  the right of the injured person (also called a victim, aggrieved
person/party)  to file  a claim  based  on provisions  governing  general
delictual liability (LOA § 1056(3) and § 1061(5)).
Although  damage  caused  by a fully  autonomous  vehicle  can,
in principle,  be indemnified by a motor insurance  undertaking,  the article
focuses  on the law  of delict.  The reason  lies  in the fact  that  the basis  for
the insurer’s  indemnification  obligation  is,  in turn,  the liability
of the injuring  person  (in common  law,  tortfeasor).  Therefore,  the motor
insurance  undertaking  of the injuring  person  is  required  to indemnify
damage only where the injuring person (insured person) is liable for it and,
in principle,  solely  to the extent  the injuring  person  is  liable  towards
the injured person.11
2. FULLY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE AS AN INTELLIGENT
MACHINE
A system is autonomous to the extent that its behaviour is determined by its
own experiences.12 Intelligence  can be  described  as a way of coping  with
complexity  and  uncertainty  owing  to the ability  to be  aware  of what  is
happening  in the surrounding  environment.13 Thus,  a fully  autonomous
vehicle can be considered an intelligent  machine.  For the purposes of this
article,  a fully  autonomous  vehicle  means  a whole,  i.e. a combination
of hardware  and  software.  Thereby  the article  does  not  focus  on how
the vehicle’s  full  autonomy  is  attained  in technical  terms,  be  it  based
11 On the prerequisites for and scope of the liability of an insurer see Lahe, J. (2017) Estland.
In: Bachmeier, W. (ed.)  Regulierung von Auslandsunfällen. 2nd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 233–235; Lahe, J., Luik, O.-J. and Merila, M. (2017) Liikluskindlustuse
seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. Tallinn: Juura, pp. 98–100.
12 Russell,  S.  J.  and Norvig,  P.  (1995)  Artificial  Intelligence:  A modern approach.  New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, p. 35.
13 See,  for  instance,  Sterling,  L.  and  Taveter,  K.  (2009)  The Art  of Agent-Oriented  Modeling.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 6. It should be added that artificial intelligence can be defined
in various  ways,  but  in essence,  these  definitions  tend  to refer  to similar  phenomena
demonstrated  by machines.  Artificial  intelligence  can  be  divided  into  narrow  artificial
intelligence (surpasses humans only in specific tasks), artificial general intelligence (human-
-like abilities) and superintelligence (beyond human abilities). See Russell, S. J. and Norvig,
P. (1995) op. cit., pp. 2, 23–28; see also Dickson, B. (2017) What is Narrow, General and Super
Artificial Intelligence. [online] Tech Talks. Available from: https://bdtechtalks.com/2017/05/12
/what-is-narrow-general-and-super-artificial-intelligence/[Accessed 30 May 2018].
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on certain  predefined  criteria  which  make  it  capable  of “thinking  and
deciding”,  on a comprehensive  code  doing  exactly  what  it  is  supposed
to do,  or on some  other  solution.  By and  large,  it  is  not  of decisive
importance from the aspect of delictual liability.
Considerable  advancements  have  been  made  in the field  of expert
systems, which are limited to specific  areas of application, including fully
autonomous vehicles, which increase the ability of road users to cope with
the complexity  of traffic.  Traffic  accidents  occur  largely  due  to reasons
attributable  to humans  who  fail  to cope  with  such  complexity.  Fully
autonomous vehicles are seen by many as a way to “tame” the complexity
of road  use  and  reduce  the number  of accidents  as well  as open  access
to transportation for people who are currently often left out (e.g. the elderly,
people with disabilities, etc.).14
The six  levels  of driving  automation  suggested  by a global  association
of engineers span from no automation to full automation.15 Full automation
means that at all times the automated driving system performs all aspects
of the dynamic  driving  task  under  all  roadway  and  environmental
conditions  that  can  be  managed  by a human  driver.16 Some  argue  that,
given  the ability  of fully  autonomous  machines  to make  highly
consequential  decisions in situations that  may not be anticipated by their
creators, society will need to consider whether existing liability rules will be
up to the task of assigning responsibility for the acts they commit.17
14 As intelligent machines become more sophisticated in their ability to solve problems, a host
of issues  arise  concerning  the moral  responsibilities  for  the acts  of intelligent  machines
sophisticated enough to raise the possibility that they are moral agents and hence morally
accountable for their acts (see Himma, K. E. (2009) Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and
the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral
Agent? Ethics and Information Technology, 11(1), pp. 19–29. Available from: https://doi.org/10
.1007/s10676-008-9167-5 [Accessed 30 May 2018].  Some even wonder whether intelligent
machines  should  be  granted  personhood  of sorts  or be  recognised  as special-purpose
animals or people (see Chopra, S. and White,  L. F. (2011)  A Legal Theory for Autonomous
Artificial  Agents.  The University  of Michigan  Press.,  p. 153;  Calo,  R.  (2015)  Robotics  and
Lessons of Cyberlaw, California Law Review, 103(3), p. 549.
15 These levels are not normative, but technical. The elements indicate minimum rather than
maximum system capabilities for each level. A particular vehicle may have multiple driving
automation features.  SAE International.  (2014)  J3016.  Taxonomy and Definitions  for  Terms
Related to On-Road Motor  Vehicle  Automated  Driving  Systems.  Available  from: https://web.
archive.org/web/20170903105244/https://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf
[Accessed 30 May 2018].
16 Ibid.
17 Vladeck,  D.  C.  (2014)  Machines  without  Principals:  Liability  Rules  and  Artificial
Intelligence.  Washington Law Review, 89 (1), pp. 117–150. Available from: http://digital.law.
washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1322/89WLR0117.pdf?sequence=1
[Accessed 30 May 2018].
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3. GENERAL DELICTUAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY FULLY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Under  § 1043  of the LOA18,  a person  who  unlawfully  causes  damage
to another must compensate for the damage where the person who caused
damage  is  at fault  thereof  or bears  statutory  liability  for  causing
the damage.  General  delictual  liability  in Estonia  is,  similarly  to general
delictual  liability  under  the German  Civil  Code  (BGB),19 built  in three
stages.  As a general  rule,  objective  elements  (objektiver  Tatbestand)  are
verified at the first stage: the act of the person who causes damage, damage
to the rights  of the injured  person,  and  a causal  link  between  them.
The second  stage  views  unlawfulness  and  the third  one  is  the fault
of the injuring person.
In the event of damage caused by a fully autonomous vehicle, engaging
in traffic  may be  deemed to be  the act  of the injuring person.  The injured
person’s legal right that is being violated can, above all, be their life (LOA
§ 1045(1)  clause  1),  health  (LOA  § 1045(1)  clause  2)  or property  (LOA
§ 1045(1) clause 5).  The same applies  to damage caused by a conventional
motor  vehicle.  Likewise,  establishing  a causal  link  between  the act
of the injuring person and the damage suffered by the injured person is not
special in any way.20
At the second  stage  of the criteria  for  general  delictual  liability,
the unlawfulness  of causing  damage  is  established.  Clauses  1–4  of LOA
§ 1045(2)  establish  the circumstances  that  preclude  the unlawfulness
of causing damage (e.g. consent or self-defence).  Where damage is caused
by the driver  of a conventional  motor  vehicle,  the unlawfulness  can
alternatively arise from a violation of a protective provision (LOA § 1045(1)
clause 7 in combination with a protective provision in the TA21) or be based
on the general catalogue of causing unlawful damage (LOA § 1045(1) clause
18 Law of Obligations  Act  (võlaõigusseadus)  2001.  SI  2001/81,  487.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja (State
Gazette). In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
510012018003/consolide [Accessed 30 May 2018].
19 Bamberger, H. G. et al. Beck’scher Online-Kommentar zum BGB. [online] 45th edition, § 823,
Rn. 15–41.  Available  from:  https://beck-online-beck-de.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/?vpath=bibdata
%2fkomm%2fBeckOKBGB_45%2fBGB%2fcont%2fBECKOKBGB%2eBGB%2eP823%2eglI
%2egl3%2ehtm [Accessed 30 May 2018].
20 According to the Estonian legal approach, a causal link is established in two stages. First,
the natural cause for damage is assessed (the conditio sine qua non test). Next, an assessment
of the legal cause for the damage is made by asking whether the purpose of the breached
rule was to obligate the injuring person and safeguard the injured person for the specific
kind of damage (LOA § 127(2)). See alsoTampuu, T. (2017) Lepinguvälised võlasuhted (Non-
-contractual obligations). Tallinn: Juura, p. 213.
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2 – causing a bodily injury or health damage to the injured person; § 1045(1)
clause 5 – infringement of ownership).
In the event of infringement of absolute legal rights such as human life,
health or ownership, unlawfulness is based on the harmful effect as such,
while  it  is  not  important  whether  the injuring  person  also  violated  any
obligation.  Unlawfulness  comes  from  the wrongfulness  of the outcome
(Erfolgsunrecht).
Establishing  unlawfulness  merely  based  on the harmful  effect  is,
however,  not  an exceptionless  rule  even  in the event  of infringing
the absolutely protected legal  rights.  Where an absolutely protected right
has been infringed by failure to act  or where the harmful  effect  is  a more
remote  outcome  of the conduct  of the injuring  person,  a duty  which
the latter  has  breached (Handlungsunrecht)  must  be  identified.  It  may  be
a statutory  duty  or the general  duty  to maintain  safety  (generale
Verkehrssicherungspflicht).22
While  in the event  of damage  caused  by a conventional  motor  vehicle
the unlawfulness of causing damage can usually be derived from harming
the injured  person’s  legal  right  (or,  alternatively,  also  from  a violation
of the provisions of the TA), it is rather questionable in the event of damage
caused by a fully autonomous vehicle. One might argue that, for instance,
in a situation  where  a person  is  inside  a fully  autonomous  vehicle  that
causes  a traffic  accident,  the person has  not  harmed the injured  person’s
legal  right  by their  active  conduct.  In such  an event,  the damage  caused
by the person who was inside the vehicle cannot be deemed to be unlawful
owing  to the mere  harming  of the injured  person’s  legal  right.  In order
to hold  the person  inside  the vehicle  liable,  a duty  which  the person  has
breached should be established. Presumably, it cannot be a statutory duty
(e.g. under  the TA).  Thus,  the liability  of the liable  person  can  be  based,
above  all,  on a breach  of the general  duty  to maintain  safety.  According
to Estonian case-law, the general  duty to maintain safety and the element
of fault  are  entwined.23 Thus,  when  examining  if a person  has  breached
21 Traffic  Act  (liiklusseadus)  2010.  SI  2010/44,  261.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State  Gazette).
In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521122017
002/consolide [Accessed 30 May 2018].
22 According to Estonian case-law, the general duty to maintain safety means a person’s duty
to make  every  reasonable  effort  to ensure that  other  persons  are  not  harmed  as a result
of the persons' actions (see Case no. 3-2-1-73-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 20
June 2013).
23 Case no. 3-2-1-73-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 20 June 2013.
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the general duty to maintain safety, one must substantively assess whether
the person  has  been  externally  (i.e. objectively)  negligent.24 It  has  been
argued  in the context  of German  law  that  putting  “blind  trust”
in the autonomous  vehicle  technology  over  a long  period  may  constitute
a breach  of the duty  to maintain  safety.25 Under  Estonian  law,  one  could
partly  agree  with  the opinion.  The owner  or possessor  of a fully
autonomous  vehicle  might  be  hypothetically  criticised  for  a breach
of the general  duty  to maintain  safety  where  the vehicle  is  not  properly
serviced  (e.g. software  updates  have  not  been  made  in a timely  manner)
or where detected errors are not reacted to “maintaining safety” should not
usually require more of the owner or possessor.
The fault of the injuring person is the third main criterion of the general
delictual liability.26 The types of fault are negligence, gross negligence and
intent (LOA § 104(2)). Negligence is failure to exercise necessary care (LOA
§ 104(3)). Gross negligence is failure to exercise necessary care to a material
extent  (LOA  § 104(4)).  Intent  is  the will  to bring  about  an unlawful
consequence  upon  creation,  performance  or termination  of an obligation
(LOA  § 104(5)).  In Estonian  law  of delict,  the injured  person’s  fault
(incl. negligence)  must  also  be  assessed  based  on the characteristics
of the injuring person. Under LOA § 1050(2), the situation, age, education,
knowledge, abilities and other personal characteristics of a person must be
taken into consideration upon assessment of the fault of the person. Under
LOA  § 1050(1),  the negligence  of the injuring  person  is  presumed,
i.e. the injuring person who wishes to avoid liability must prove the absence
of their fault.
In the event  of damage  caused  by a fully  autonomous  vehicle,
the absence  of fault  (or a breach  of the duty  to maintain  safety)  may  be
the reason  why  general  delictual  liability  is  not  applicable  to the owner
or possessor  of the vehicle  (or a person  who  simply  travelled  in the fully
24 The Supreme Court explained in its 20 June 2013 judgment in case no. 3-2-1-73-13 that since
the general  duty  to maintain  safety  means,  according  to the generally  recognised  view,
a duty of care for the purposes of the legal  theory,  negligence is one of the forms of fault
under LOA § 104(2) and LOA § 1050(1) establishes that a person who unlawfully caused
damage is presumed to be at fault,  the defendant has the burden to prove that it  did not
breach the general duty to maintain safety.
25 Volker, M., Jänich, P. T. and Schrader, V. R. (2015) Rechtsprobleme des autonomen Fahrens.
Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, 28(7), p. 316.
26 For  a comparative  discussion  on the fault  of the injuring  person  see  Lahe,  J.  (2013)
The Concept of Fault  of the Tortfeasor in Estonian Tort  Law: A Comparative Perspective.
Review of Central and East European Law, 38(2), pp. 141−170.
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autonomous  vehicle  at the time  of the traffic  accident).  For  instance,
if a fully autonomous vehicle causes damage to a third party due to a bug
in the control  program,  one  cannot  usually  argue  that  the owner
or possessor  of the vehicle  failed  to exercise  due care or perform the duty
to maintain safety. As noted above, the situation may prove different where
the vehicle has not been duly maintained or serviced. Nevertheless, it may
be  concluded  that  usually  it  is  not  reasonable  or fruitful  for  the injured
person  who  has  suffered  damage  caused  by a fully  autonomous  vehicle
to bring  a claim  against  the owner  or possessor  of the vehicle  based
on provisions governing general delictual liability.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the injured person’s ability
to enforce  their  claim  on the basis  of general  delictual  liability  is
considerably  affected  by the fact  of whether  the damage  was  caused
by a conventional  motor  vehicle  or a fully  autonomous  vehicle.
The difference  will  not  create  a deep  practical  issue  where  the injured
person’s  chances  of receiving  compensation  for  damage  are  sufficiently
ensured using other instruments, above all, legislation on strict liability and
product liability.
4. STRICT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY FULLY
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Strict  liability is liability for damage caused by a greater source of danger
regardless of fault. In case of strict liability, attention is not paid to the act
or fault of the injuring person, but it is examined if the harmful effect was
caused  by the manifestation  of a higher  risk  characteristic  of the thing
or activity.  Thus,  being  in control  of the greater  source  of danger,
the operator of a motor vehicle  is  liable  for the damage caused regardless
of whether  the operator  violated  the TA  while  engaging  in traffic
or whether  the operator  was  at fault.  The causing  of damage  by a greater
source  of danger  means  the emergence  of damage  as a result
of the manifestation of a heightened risk inherent in a thing or activity that
constitutes  the greater  source  of danger.27 As noted  by H.  Koziol,  strict
liability  means  liability  for  dangerousness.28 In Europe,  the application
of strict liability in case of damage caused by a motor vehicle is widespread.
27 See Case no. 3-2-1-161-10 (2011) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 2 March 2011.
28 Koziol, H. (2012)  Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective. Wien: Jan Sramek
Verlag, p. 234.
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It  has  been  argued  that  in countries  where  there  is  no  strict  liability,
the same  end  result  for  the injured  person  is  reached  with  the help
of the insurance system or by raising the required standard of care.29
Where  a motor  vehicle  causes  damage,  the easiest  solution  for
the injured person is to build its claim for damages on LOA § 1057, which
states that the direct possessor of the motor vehicle is liable for any damage
caused  upon  operating30 the motor  vehicle.31 Under  clause  40  of § 2
of the TA,  a power-driven  vehicle  means  a vehicle  that  is  powered
by an engine,  except  for  an engine-powered  vehicle  designated  for  use
solely by a person with reduced mobility, an electric cycle, a self-balancing
vehicle,  a mini  moped,  a self-driving  delivery  robot,  an off-road  vehicle,
a tram  and  a vehicle  with  a manufacturer  speed  of no  more  than  six
kilometres  per hour.  It  should  be  added  that  the definition  of a motor
vehicle used in LOA § 1057 is broader than the definition of a power-driven
vehicle used in the TA, because under the respective provision of the LOA,
for  instance,  an aircraft  is  also  deemed to be  a motor  vehicle.  Thus,  it  is
obvious that a fully autonomous vehicle can be considered a motor vehicle
within the meaning of LOA § 1057.
Under LOA § 1057, only the direct possessor of a motor vehicle can be
held liable.  Under the Law of Property Act (LPA)32 § 33(1),  a possessor  is
a person  who  has  actual  control  over  a thing.  The second  subsection
of the same  section  states  that  a person  who  possesses  a thing  under
a commercial  lease,  residential  lease,  deposit,  pledge  or other  similar
relationship  which  grants  the person  the right  to possess  the thing
of another person temporarily is the direct possessor, while the other person
is the indirect possessor. According to the case-law of the Estonian Supreme
29 von Bar, C. (2009) Principles of European Law: Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage
Caused to Another. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, p. 703.
30 Damage  is  caused  upon  operating  a motor  vehicle,  above  all,  when  it  arises  from
the purposeful use of the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle in traffic.  The slow movement
of a vehicle or, in exceptional circumstances, the static status of a vehicle on the road may be
considered  operating  the vehicle  (see  Case  no. 3-2-1-7-13 (2013)  Supreme  Court  (Civil
Chamber), 19 March 2013).
31 In LOA § 1056(1),  the application  of strict  liability  is  limited  to cases  where (in the given
context,  by operating  a motor  vehicle)  the death  of a person,  a bodily  injury  or health
damage has been caused or where a thing has been damaged. In German law, strict liability
relating  to a motor  vehicle  is  not  provided  for  in the BGB,  but  in § 7
of the Strassenverkehrsgesetz  (StVG),  according  to subsection  1  of which  the liability
of the keeper (Halter)  of a motor vehicle is  not dependent on fault.  However, the liability
of the driver is fault-based (StVG § 18(1)).
32 Law  of Property  Act (asjaõigusseadus).  1993.  SI  1993/39,  590.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State
Gazette). In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
504012018002/consolide [Accessed 7 June 2018].
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Court, the liability under LOA § 1057 rests with, above all, the person who
has  actual  control  over  a motor  vehicle  regardless  of the legal  ground
or absence thereof. In other words, with the person who controls the vehicle
by deciding when and where it moves, bears the related costs and economic
risks, and enjoys advantages arising from using the vehicle.33
The driver of a motor vehicle is not always deemed to be having actual
control  over  the vehicle.  The most  common  situation  in that  regard  is
the performance of employment duties using the employer’s motor vehicle.
Under  LPA  § 33(3),  a person  who  exercises  actual  control  over  a thing
according  to the orders  of another  person  in the household  or enterprise
of the other person is not a possessor. Thus, in the given case LOA § 1057 is
not  applicable  to an employee  either.34 At the same  time,  the servient
possessor  may  still  be  liable  under  provisions  governing  fault-based
delictual liability. As noted above, it would not be an effective option from
the point  of view of a person who has suffered damage caused by a fully
autonomous vehicle, because usually delictual liability would be precluded
due  to the absence  of fault  or breach  of the duty  to maintain  safety
by the servient  possessor.  Thus,  it  may  be  concluded  that,  unlike  with
conventional  vehicles,  the liability  of persons  other  than  the direct
possessors  is  considerably  more  limited  in the event  of damage  caused
by fully autonomous vehicles. It could also be argued that it is a reasonable
solution, for an employee should not be held liable for causing damage with
a fully  autonomous  vehicle  in a situation  where  nothing  is  imputable
to the employee regarding the damage caused.
The Estonian LOA also sets out general strict liability.35 It can be argued
with high certainty that a fully autonomous vehicle should be considered
a greater source of danger for the purposes of LOA § 1056(2) (at least until
the time when technology allows for avoiding accidents entirely). Thus, it
33 Case no. 3-2-1-7-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 19 March 2013.
34 Varul, P. et al.  (2009)  Võlaõigusseadus III. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations Act.
Commented Edition. Vol. III). Tallinn: Juura, p. 696.
35 The first  sentence  of LOA  § 1056(1)  states:  “where  damage  is  caused  as a result  of a danger
characteristic  of an especially  dangerous  thing  or activity,  the person  who  controls  the source
of danger is liable for causing the damage regardless of the person’s fault.” Under LOA § 1056(2),
a thing  or activity  is  deemed  to be  a greater  source  of danger  where,  due  to its  nature
or to the substances or means used in connection therewith, major or frequent damage may
arise therefrom even where due diligence expected of a professional is exercised.  Where
liability  for  causing  damage  by means  of a source  of danger  is  prescribed  by law,  it  is
presumed  that  the thing  or activity  constitutes  a greater  source  of danger  regardless
of the fault of the person who controlled it. It should be noted that there is no general clause
on strict liability in Germany. A brief overview concerning discussions on a general clause
of strict liability in European law of delict is given in Koziol, H. (2012), op. cit., pp. 236–238.
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cannot be precluded that the driver of a motor vehicle who does not qualify
as the direct possessor of the vehicle under LOA § 1057 can still be deemed
to be  in control  of the greater  source  of danger  for  the purposes  of LOA
§ 1056(1)  (the owner  of the vehicle  who  is  not  the direct  possessor  could
likewise  be  considered  to be  in control  of the greater  source  of danger –
such need may arise, for instance, in the event of the insolvency of the direct
possessor). Even though this view has not yet been confirmed in Estonian
case-law,  there  is  substance  for  such  a discussion  owing  to a decision
of the Supreme Court.  The court held that a person who is  riding a horse
but  who is  simultaneously  not  the keeper  of the animal  for  the purposes
of LOA § 1060 may be deemed to be in control of a greater source of danger
under LOA § 1056(1).36
The fact  that  the respective  provision  contains  a list  of events  where
the strict liability of the direct possessor of the motor vehicle does not apply
can be seen as the main problem in connection with the application of LOA
§ 1057. Under LOA § 1057 clauses 1–5, the provision does not apply where:
1) the damage is caused to a thing being transported by the motor
vehicle and not being worn or carried by a person in the vehicle;
2) the damage  is  caused  to a thing  deposited  with  the possessor
of the motor vehicle;
3) the damage  is  caused  by force  majeure  or by an intentional  act
on the part  of the injured  person,  unless  the damage  is  caused
upon operation of an aircraft;37
4) the injured  person  participates  in the operation  of the motor
vehicle;
5) the injured  person  is  carried  without  charge  and  outside
the economic activities of the carrier.
36 Case no. 3-2-1-27-07 (2007) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 18 April 2007. The application
of the general  clause  of strict  liability  (LOA  § 1056)  may  be  precluded  by the fact  that
the injured  person  was  somehow  related  to the greater  source  of danger.  In the same
decision,  the Supreme Court  noted that  persons  who participate  in controlling  a greater
source of danger, place a greater source of danger under their temporary control or receive
gains from controlling a greater source of danger are not, given the principle of good faith,
entitled  to claim  on the basis  of provisions  governing  strict  liability  that  the person
controlling  the greater  source  of danger  compensate  for  damage  caused  to them
by the greater source of danger.
37 The force majeure precluding the liability of the person controlling a greater source of danger
may  be  an extraordinary  natural  phenomenon  that  assumes  the position  of the danger
emanating  from  the greater  source  of danger  and  the impact  of which  the person
controlling the greater source of danger or the injured person could not and did not have
to take  into  account  (Case  no. 3-2-1-111-05 (2005)  Supreme  Court  (Civil  Chamber),
21 November 2005).
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As noted above, in the case of these preclusions it is possible, based on
LOA  § 1056(3),  to apply  general  delictual  liability  towards  the direct
possessor  of the motor vehicle,  but  due to the absence  of fault  or a breach
of the duty to maintain safety, it may prove ineffectual. Thus, at first glance,
it may seem as a serious problem.
A closer look at the preclusions set out in LOA § 1057 clauses 1–5 allows
for  drawing  a conclusion  that  these are unlikely  to cause  major  practical
problems  also  in the context  of fully  autonomous  vehicles.  As regards
clauses  1  and  2,  the injured  person  should,  as a rule,  be  able  to claim
damages  under  contract  law.38 Where  damage  has  been  caused
by an intentional  act  or force  majeure  (clause  3),  the causal  link  between
the manifestation  of a risk  inherent  in a vehicle  and  the damage  caused
to the injured  person  is  broken  and  the injured  person  should  not  be
entitled to damages (we would reach the same result also upon application
of general delictual liability towards the possessor of a conventional motor
vehicle). Where the injured person participates in operating a motor vehicle
(clause 4), they usually act on a contractual basis (travelling in a bus or taxi
does not qualify as participating in operating a motor vehicle). Thus, claims
for damages under contract law are possible.
Perhaps the most problematic one is the preclusion contained in clause 5.
If A (the owner of a fully  autonomous  vehicle)  carries  B  (an acquaintance
of theirs)  free  of charge  and  outside  their  economic  activities  and
an accident occurs in which B is injured, the application of LOA § 1057 to A
is  not  possible  and  fault-based  liability  would  probably  be  precluded
by the absence of A’s fault. In such a situation, there may but does not need
to be a contract between A and B. It  is  possible that A was benevolently
intervening  in another’s  affairs  (negotiorum  gestio; Geschäftsführung  ohne
Auftrag) when carrying B. In the event where the intervention is  justified,
the beneficiary  can  claim  damages,  but  only  where  the intervener  was
negligent (LOA § 1022(1)). Thus, the ultimate outcome may be that B cannot
claim damages from A under any ground. Yet it can also be argued that this
is  a fair  outcome,  because  B  voluntarily  accepted  the respective  risk.
Besides,  B  will  in any  event  retain  the right  to claim  damages  from
the manufacturer of the fully autonomous vehicle.
38 It  should  be  added  that,  according  to the general  rule,  contractual  liability  is  similarly
to strict liability not dependent on fault. The debtor is discharged from liability if the debtor
breached a duty or obligation due to force majeure (LOA § 103(2)).
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5. PRODUCT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY FULLY
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
The issue  of product  liability  is  probably  more  burning  regarding  fully
autonomous vehicles than conventional motor vehicles. In a situation where
damage is  caused by a fully autonomous vehicle,  one can almost  always
raise the question of a defect of the fully autonomous vehicle. For instance,
if the injured  person  demands  that  the direct  possessor  of the vehicle
compensate for damage under LOA § 1057, the issue of product liability can
usually be raised. This entitles the direct possessor who has compensated
the injured  person  for  damage  to file  a recourse  claim  against
the manufacturer  (provided,  of course,  that  the manufacturer  is  indeed
liable)  based  on LOA  § 137(2),  which  regulates  mutual  recourse  claims
of persons that are jointly and severally liable for causing damage.
In the LOA,  the rules  regulating  product  liability  are  set  out
in §§ 1061–1067.39 Keeping  in mind  fully  autonomous  vehicles,
the following can be pointed out as prerequisites for product liability:
1) a legal  right  of the injured  person  has  been  infringed  (death,
bodily  injury  or health damage;  with  certain  reservations  also
infringement of ownership;40
2) a defective  fully  autonomous  vehicle  has  been  put  into
circulation as a product;
3) there is a causal link between the defect of the fully autonomous
vehicle and the damage caused to the injured person; and
4) the absence of circumstances precluding product liability.41
Under LOA § 1063(1), any movable, including electricity and computer
software, is deemed to be a product, even where the movable forms a part
of another  movable  or has  become  part  of an immovable.  Thus,  both
39 The rules are based on Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation
of the laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  of the Member  States  concerning
liability for defective products. Official Journal of the European Union (L 210) 7 August 1985.
Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.1985.210
.01.0029.01.ENG  [Accessed  30  May  2018]  and  Directive  1999/34/EC  of the European
Parliament  and  of the Council  of 10  May  1999  amending  Council  Directive  85/374/EEC
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States  concerning  liability  for  defective  products.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union
(L 141) 4 June 1999. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/uri=uri
serv:OJ.L_.1999.141.01.0020.01.ENG  [Accessed  30  May  2018].  Thus,  the product  liability
legislation of the Member States of the EU is largely similar.
40 LOA § 1061(1) and (2).
41 LOA § 1064.
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the fully autonomous vehicle as a whole as well as, for instance, a computer
program that controls the vehicle can be considered a product. By the same
token,  both  the person  who  manufactured  the fully  autonomous  vehicle
as a whole as well as a part of the product (e.g. a computer program) can be
considered the manufacturer.42
Thus,  provided that  the prerequisites  for  liability  are  met,  the injured
person can,  in principle,  file  a claim for damages against  the person who
manufactured  the fully  autonomous  vehicle  as well  as the persons  who
made parts thereof. Regardless of the seat of the manufacturer, the injured
person  can  also  file  a claim  against  the manufacturer  based  on the place
where  the damaging  act  was  committed  or the damaging  event  occurred
or based on the place where the damage was suffered.43
However, product liability is not absolute. LOA § 1064(1) stipulates that
the manufacturer  is  not  liable  for  damage  arising  from a product  where
the manufacturer proves that:
1) the manufacturer has not placed the product on the market;
2) circumstances exist on the basis of which it can be presumed that
the product did not have the damage-causing defect at the time
the product was placed on the market by the manufacturer;
3) the manufacturer  did  not  make  the product  for  sale  or for
marketing  in any  other  manner  and  did  not  manufacture
or market  it  in the course  of the manufacturer’s  economic
or professional activities;
4) the defect  was  caused  by compliance  of the product  with
mandatory  requirements  in force  at the time  of placing
the product on the market;
5) given the level of scientific and technical knowledge at the time
of placing  the product  on the market,  the defect  could  not  be
detected. 
Additionally, the producer of a raw material or a part of a product is not
liable  for  damage  where  the producer  proves  that  the defect  of the raw
42 LOA § 1062(1) clause 1.
43 Section  94  of the Code  of Civil  Procedure  (CCP)  (tsiviilkohtumenetluse  seadustik).  2005.
SI 2005/26,  87.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State  Gazette).  In Estonian.  English  translation
available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/506022018001/consolide [Accessed 7 June
2018].  In Estonia,  injured  parties  do  not  usually  bring  claims  against  manufacturers.
To date,  the Supreme  Court  is  yet  to make  its  first  decision  based  on product  liability
legislation.
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material  or part  was  caused  by the construction  of the finished  product
or the instructions given by the manufacturer of the finished product (LOA
§ 1064(2)).
Upon  holding  the manufacturer  liable  for  damage  caused  by defects
of a fully autonomous vehicle or parts thereof, the key question is, above all,
how to apply LOA § 1064(1) clause 5. In other words, how extensive will be
manufacturers’  chances  of proving  that  a defect  of the product  could  not
have been detected based on the scientific  and technical  level  at the time.
Too extensive  application of this  exception cannot be deemed reasonable
regarding  defects  of fully  autonomous  vehicles,  because  otherwise
the product liability legislation would largely lose its meaning in the context
of new technologies.
Similarly  to strict  liability,  the manufacturer  can  be  held  liable  based
on general  delictual  liability  in a situation  where  product  liability  is
precluded (LOA § 1061(5)). Where product liability rules are not applicable,
for  instance,  because  of LOA  § 1064(1)  clause  5,  this  fact  allows
the manufacturer  to easily  prove  that  it  was  not  at fault  regarding
the damage and still be discharged from liability.
It can be argued that there are no differences of principle when it comes
to the application of product liability provisions based on whether damage
has  been  caused  by a fully  autonomous  vehicle  or a conventional  motor
vehicle.  However,  it  cannot  be  precluded  that  in the case  of fully
autonomous  vehicles  the courts  are  more  eager  to apply  the preclusion
of liability  arising  from  LOA  § 1064(1)  clause  5  in order  not  to impede
technological development.
6.  DIVISION OF LIABILITY IN THE EVENT OF MUTUAL
DAMAGE
An important  special  problem  in connection  with  fully  autonomous
vehicles may be the question of how to divide liability in a situation where
a fully autonomous vehicle and a conventional motor vehicle have caused
mutual  damage.44 In Estonian  law,  there  is  no  separate  legal  rule  for
division  of liability  in the event  of mutual  damage  caused  by motor
44 Where mutual damage has been caused by two fully autonomous vehicles, it  should be
possible  to rely  on the general  rules  applicable  to situations  involving  mutual  damage
caused by two conventional motor vehicles.
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vehicles.45 However,  the ultimate  damages  can  be  adjusted  based
on a general  rule that  regulates  the reduction of damages (LOA § 139(1)),
which  states  that  where  damage  is  caused  in part  by circumstances
dependent  on the injured  person  or due  to a risk  borne  by the injured
person,  the amount  of damages  is  reduced  to the extent  that  such
circumstances or risk contributed to the damage.46
The LOA  is  based  on the idea  according  to which  persons  who  have
caused mutual damage with motor vehicles are (above all, based on LOA
§ 1057) fully liable  for causing damage to each other  in the first  step,  but
the damages  payable  by either  one  of them  can  be  adjusted  on the basis
of LOA  § 139(1),  i.e. the damages  payable  can  be  reduced  because
of the share of the injured person in causing the damage. Under LOA § 139,
on the one  hand,  the circumstances  arising  from  the motor  vehicle
operational  risk  and,  on the other  hand,  circumstances  characterising
the behaviour  of the drivers  can  be  taken  into  account  upon  reducing
the damages.47
The reason for  taking  into  account  the motor  vehicle  operational  risk
(Betriebsgefahr) lies in the understanding that once a person already engages
in traffic using a motor vehicle (i.e. enters a dangerous situation), alone this
fact  is  a sufficient  ground  for  reducing  the damages  to a certain  extent.
In the framework  of the operational  risk,  one  can  distinguish  between
the general  operational  risk  and  a special  operational  risk.
The circumstances  affecting  the general  operational  risk  include,  for
instance,  the mass,  dimensions,  speed of movement,  roadworthiness  and
safety equipment of the vehicle.  Thus,  the risk arising from a heavy truck
may be considerably higher than the risk arising from a moped. A special
operational risk means the objective nature and dangerousness of a specific
45 Unlike in,  for  example,  German law where,  under  StVG § 17,  the obligation  of multiple
keepers  of motor  vehicles  to compensate  for  damage  caused  to a third  party  depends
on the circumstances of the accident, above all, on which person mainly caused the damage.
Under  StVG  § 17(2),  the principle  set  out  in subsection  1  also  applies  upon  division
of mutual  liability  between  keepers  of motor  vehicles  where  damage  has  been  caused
to a keeper of a motor vehicle involved in the accident. The respective provisions also apply
where  the damage  has  been  mutually  caused  by a motor  vehicle  and  a trailer,  a motor
vehicle and an animal, and a motor vehicle and a train (StVG § 17(4)).
46 Special problems arise where more than two motor vehicles have been involved in causing
damage.  On such  a situation  see  Bachmeier,  W.  (2010) Verkehrszivilsachen.  2nd  edition.
München: C. H. Beck, pp. 72–77.
47 Case no. 3-2-1-7-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 19 March 2013. The same criteria
are followed upon division of liability also in German law. See Säcker, F. J., Rixecker, R. and
Oetker,  H. (2012)  Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Band 2. Schuldrecht.
Allgemeiner Teil. 6th edition. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, p. 528.
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manoeuvre. Thereafter, upon reducing the damages, it is important to also
assess  the behaviour  of the persons  who  were  involved  in the accident,
above  all,  whether  they  failed  to exercise  due  care  and  disregarded
the traffic rules.48
On the basis thereof, the extent of reduction of both parties’ damages is
established.49 If the share of one person was higher in causing the accident,
it  must  be  taken  into  account  upon  reducing  the damages  on the basis
of LOA § 139(1).50
According to the opinions established in Estonian case-law, the damages
must  be  presumably  reduced  50 %  in a situation  where  both  drivers
breached the requirements for safe road use established in the TA and their
share  in the traffic  accident  was,  given  their  behaviour  as well
as the operational risks emanating from their vehicles, more or less equal.51
By way  of exception,  the damages  can  be  reduced  to the minimum  or be
precluded in a situation where it has been established that the accident was
caused  solely  by a severe  mistake  of one  person,  as a result  of which
the other person who did not break the rules, could not reasonably avoid
the accident.52 In certain events, the share of the drivers involved in a traffic
accident may also remain unknown. § 139 of the LOA is also applied where
it  is  not  proven  that  either  person  breached  the traffic  rules.  In such
an event, the basis for reducing the damages is the operating risks arising
from the vehicles.53
48 Case no. 3-2-1-7-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 19 March 2013.
49 In German law, Haftungsquoten. For a detailed discussion of the case-law regarding liability
quotas  see  Grüneberg,  C.  (2007) Haftungsquoten  bei Verkehrsunfällen.  Eine  systematische
Zusammenstellung  veröffentlichter  Entscheidungen  nach  dem  StVG.  10th edition.  München:
Verlag C. H. Beck.
50 Case no. 3-2-1-64-15 (2015) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 26 November 2015.
51 In German case-law, liability is divided 50-50 in the case of an equal operational risk and
fault. For further information see Grüneberg, C (2007), op. cit.
52 Case no. 3-2-1-64-15 (2015) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 26 November 2015. Likewise,
according to German case-law a person is discharged from the obligation to compensate for
damage in the case  of an unpreventable  event  (unabwendbares  Ereignis).  See  Hentschel,  P.
(2003)  Strassenverkehrsrecht. Beck’sche Kurzkommentare.  37th edition. München: Verlag C. H.
Beck, pp. 227–231. Where the fault of a person is the overwhelming reason for the accident,
it may eliminate the operational risk emanating from the other person’s vehicle (Säcker, F.
J.,  Rixecker,  R.  and  Oetker,  H.  (2012),  op.  cit.,  p. 562).  In general,  a road  user  can  rely
on the fact  that  the other  road  user  does  not  intentionally  commit  a severe  breach
of the traffic rules (Ibid., p. 537).
53 Case no. 3-2-1-64-15 (2015) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 26 November 2015. According
to the case-law established in Germany, the liability quota of either person is 50 % in such
case. See Greger, R. (2007) Haftungsrecht des Strassenverkehrs. 4th edition. Berlin: De Gruyter
Recht, p. 619.
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In the case  of fully  autonomous  vehicles,  one  must  first  decide  how
to assess the size of their operational risk. On the one hand, one could argue
that the operational risk of fully autonomous vehicles should be higher than
that  of conventional  vehicles,  because  they  are  merely  controlled
by a computer  program  and  a human  basically  lacks  the opportunity
to “correct” the program’s errors. On the other hand, it could be argued that
the operational  risk  of a fully  autonomous  vehicle  should  be  considered
smaller,  because such vehicles do not cause damage due to human error
and refrain from causing damage in so far as possible according to the laws
of physics.  For  instance,  it  may happen that  upon manifestation of a risk
the breaking distance of a fully autonomous vehicle is considerably shorter,
because the program is able to initiate breaking with virtually no reaction
time.
With fully autonomous vehicles  it  is  not possible to take into account
the driver’s  behaviour  (whether  the driver  violated  the traffic  rules).
Therefore, it  seems that the operational  risk of fully autonomous vehicles
must  be  assessed  based  on rules  different  from  those  applicable
to conventional  motor  vehicles.  For  example,  while  damages are  usually
reduced by approx. 20–30 % based on the operational risk,54 there will likely
be  a need  to deviate  from  this  principle  regarding  fully  autonomous
vehicles and deem the operational risk of a fully autonomous vehicle to be
higher  than  usual.  This  question  is  important  because  the reduction
of the damages  of one  party  to an accident  affects  the reduction
of the damages of the other party. Presumably the ultimate result must be
damages that do not exceed 100 % in total, i.e. if it has been identified that
the damages of one party must be reduced to 40 %, those of the other must
be reduced to 60 % in general.
When  a fully  autonomous  vehicle,  due  to a programming  error
or otherwise,  causes  damage  to an injured  person  who  did  not  breach
the traffic rules or was not negligent, the injured person’s damages could be
reduced only to the extent of the operational risk arising from their vehicle
(20 %  for  instance,  and  therefore,  the damages  of the owner  of the fully
autonomous vehicle  should be reduced presumably  80 %).  Where a fully
autonomous  vehicle  has  caused  damage  in a way  that  in the case
of a conventional  vehicle  would  mean  a severe  mistake  of the driver
54 Säcker, F. J., Rixecker, R. and Oetker, H. (2012), op. cit., p. 562.
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(e.g. driving  onto  the intersection  while  the traffic  lights  prohibit  it),
the damages  of the owner  of the fully  autonomous  vehicle  should  be
reduced to zero and the damages caused to the injured person should be
compensated for in full. Thus, the operational risk of the fully autonomous
vehicles  should  be  considered  100 %  in such  event.  If the damages
of the owner  of the fully  autonomous  vehicle  were  reduced  by merely
20–30 %  in such  an event,  it  would  lead  to a clearly  unfair  result  for
the other party involved in the traffic accident.
Finally, it may be argued that even though the fair division of liability
in the event where damage is caused by a fully autonomous vehicle calls for
certain  adjustment  of the practice  of application  of LOA  § 139,  it  is  not
a complicated task upon shaping case-law. At any rate, there are no rules
in Estonian law, which would prevent the courts from reaching a fair and
just result upon division of liability in the described situations.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Fully  autonomous  vehicles  will  be  put  into  daily  operation  soon.  This
scenario must also be taken into account in legislative  drafting and case-
-law.  As noted  in the introduction,  traffic  accidents  caused  by semi-
-autonomous vehicles have become a reality. Thereby the main question is
whether traditional rules of the law of delict adequately regulate liability for
damage caused by fully autonomous vehicles. This question will arise in all
countries where fully autonomous vehicles are introduced.
It  can  be  argued  that  the application  of delictual  liability  is  affected
by the fact  of whether  damage  is  caused  by a conventional  motor  vehicle
or a fully autonomous vehicle. Above all, it is expressed in the impossibility
to apply  the general  fault-based  liability  towards  the owner  or possessor
of a fully  autonomous  vehicle.  The reason  lies  in the fact  that  usually
the owner  of a fully  autonomous  vehicle  cannot  be  reproached  for
negligence  or a breach  of the duty  to maintain  safety.  The difficulty
of applying  fault-based  liability  upon  damage  caused  by a fully
autonomous  vehicle  is  universal  and  should  also  concern  other  legal
systems  besides  Estonia.  However,  there  is  no  reason  to consider  this
a serious  problem  in practice,  provided  that  the injured  person  is
guaranteed damages based on provisions governing strict liability.
An analysis  of Estonian  law  of delict  allows  for  drawing  a conclusion
that,  in most  cases,  the injured person can file  a claim under LOA § 1057
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against  the direct  possessor  of the fully  autonomous  vehicle,  regardless
of their fault. If the direct possessor proves insolvent, general strict liability
might  be  of help,  for  it  allows  for  holding,  for  instance,  the owner
of the fully  autonomous  vehicle  who  is  simultaneously  not  the direct
possessor  of the vehicle  liable  as  a person  in control  of a greater  source
of danger. The application of LOA § 1057 is indeed restricted in the events
specified  in clauses  1–5,  but  these  preclusions  do not  considerably  affect
the injured  person’s  position.  In the case  of the preclusions,  the injured
person may have the right to claim damages under contract law (clauses 1, 2
and  4).  In circumstances  described  in clause  3  of § 1057  of the LOA
(the injured person’s intent or force majeure), the injured person is clearly not
entitled  to damages.  It  is  debatable  whether  the preclusion  contained
in clause 5 of § 1057 of the LOA (carrying the injured person free of charge
and  outside  economic  activities)  is  justified  with  regard  to fully
autonomous vehicles.
As for the application of provisions governing product liability, there are
no fundamental differences based on whether damage arises from a defect
of a fully  autonomous  or conventional  motor  vehicle.  The fair  and  just
division  of liability  for  mutual  damage  caused  by a fully  autonomous
vehicle  and  a conventional  motor  vehicle  is  possible  without  amending
the law in force.
Thus, the Estonian example illustrates that the safeguarding of the rights
of the injured person is not considerably influenced by whether the damage
has  been  caused  by a fully  autonomous  vehicle  or a conventional  motor
vehicle. The traditional law of delict is largely able to safeguard the injured
person  regardless  of the fact  that  fault-based  liability  cannot  usually  be
applied  regarding  fully  autonomous  vehicles.  However,  the importance
of product  liability  legislation  may  start  to play  a more  important  role
in that regard. Therefore, there is no urgent need to amend the law of delict
in the anticipation  of fully  autonomous  vehicles.  By and  large,  this
conclusion  should  also  apply  to other  countries  where  the structure
of the law of delict resembles that of Estonia.
However,  it  cannot  be  precluded  that  in countries  that  have  not
introduced strict  liability  for  damage caused by motor  vehicles  or where
the preclusions  of strict  liability  are  considerable,  the rules  of the law
of delict may need some modification. There would be no practical need for
it in a situation where the insurance system guaranteed the injured person
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compensation also in a situation where the injuring person was not liable
for the damage.
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] Bachmeier, W. (2010) Verkehrszivilsachen. 2nd edition. München: C. H. Beck.
[2] Bamberger, H. G. et al. Beck’scher Online-Kommentar zum BGB. [online] 45th edition, § 823,
Rn. 15–41.  Available  from:  https://beck-online-beck-de.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/?vpath=bib
data%2fkomm%2fBeckOKBGB_45%2fBGB%2fcont%2fBECKOKBGB%2eBGB%2eP823%2
eglI%2egl3%2ehtm [Accessed 7 June 2018].
[3] Calo,  R.  (2015)  Robotics  and  Lessons  of Cyberlaw,  California  Law  Review,  103(3),
pp. 513–563.
[4] Case no. 3-2-1-111-05 (2005) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 21 November 2005.
[5] Case no. 3-2-1-27-07 (2007) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 18 April 2007.
[6] Case no. 3-2-1-161-10 (2011) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 2 March 2011.
[7] Case no. 3-2-1-7-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 19 March 2013.
[8] Case no. 3-2-1-73-13 (2013) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 20 June 2013.
[9] Case no. 3-2-1-64-15 (2015) Supreme Court (Civil Chamber), 26 November 2015.
[10] Chopra,  S.  and  White,  L.  F.  (2011)  A Legal  Theory  for  Autonomous  Artificial  Agents.
The University of Michigan Press.
[11] Code of Civil Procedure (tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik)  2005. SI 2005/26, 87. Estonia: Riigi
Teataja  (State  Gazette).  In Estonian.  English  translation  available  from:
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/506022018001/consolide [Accessed 7 June 2018].
[12] Contissa,  G.  et  al.  (2013)  Liability  and  automation:  Issues  and  challenges  for  socio-
-technical  systems.  Journal  of Aerospace  Operations,  (2),  pp. 79–98.  Available  from:
https://pure.tue.nl/ws/files/3915758/24573390365552.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[13] Council  Directive  85/374/EEC  of 25  July  1985  on the approximation  of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective products. Official Journal of the European Union (L 210) 7 August 1985. Available
from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.1985.210.01.0029.
01.ENG [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[14] Dickson, B. (2017)  What is Narrow, General and Super Artificial Intelligence. [online] Tech
Talks.  Available  from:  https://bdtechtalks.com/2017/05/12/what-is-narrow-general-and-
super-artificial-intelligence/ [Accessed 30 May 2018].
2018] T. Liivak, J. Lahe: Delictual Liability for Damage ... 71
[15] Directive  1999/34/EC  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 10  May  1999
amending Council  Directive  85/374/EEC on the approximation  of the laws,  regulations
and  administrative  provisions  of the Member  States  concerning  liability  for  defective
products.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union  (L  141)  4  June  1999.  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.1999.141.01.0020.01.
ENG [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[16] Geistfeld,  M.  (2017)  A Roadmap  for  Autonomous  Vehicles:  State  Tort  Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation. California Law Review, 105(6).
[17] Government Office EU Secretariat. (2017) Driverless buses arrive in Tallinn. [press release]
14  July.  Available  from:  https://www.eu2017.ee/news/press-releases/driverless-buses-
arrive-tallinn [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[18] Greger, R. (2007) Haftungsrecht des Strassenverkehrs. 4th edition. Berlin: De Gruyter Recht.
[19] Grüneberg,  C.  (2007) Haftungsquoten  bei  Verkehrsunfällen.  Eine  systematische
Zusammenstellung veröffentlichter  Entscheidungen nach dem StVG.  10th edition. München:
Verlag C. H. Beck.
[20] Hawkins, A. J. (2018) Uber ‘Likely’ not at Fault in Deadly Self-Driving Car Crash, Police Chief
Says. [online] The Verge. Available from: https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/20/17142672/
uber-deadly-self-driving-car-crash-fault-police [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[21] Hentschel,  P.  (2003)  Strassenverkehrsrecht.  Beck’sche  Kurzkommentare.  37th edition.
München: Verlag C. H. Beck.
[22] Himma,  K.  E.  (2009)  Artificial  Agency,  Consciousness,  and  the Criteria  for  Moral
Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent? Ethics and
Information Technology, 11(1),  pp. 19−29.  Available  from: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-
008-9167-5 [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[23] Koziol, H. (2012) Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective. Wien: Jan Sramek
Verlag.
[24] Lahe,  J.  (2013)  The Concept  of Fault  of the Tortfeasor  in Estonian  Tort  Law:
A Comparative Perspective. Review of Central and East European Law, 38(2), pp. 141−170.
[25] Lahe,  J.  (2017)  Estland.  In: Bachmeier,  W.  (ed.)  Regulierung  von  Auslandsunfällen.
2nd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
[26] Lahe,  J.,  Luik,  O.-J.  and  Merila,  M.  (2017)  Liikluskindlustuse  seadus.  Kommenteeritud
väljaanne. Tallinn: Juura.
72 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 12:1
[27] Law of Obligations Act (võlaõigusseadus) 2001. SI 2001/81, 487. Estonia: Riigi Teataja (State
Gazette). In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/510012018003/consolide [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[28] Law of Property Act (asjaõigusseadus). 1993. SI 1993/39, 590. Estonia: Riigi  Teataja (State
Gazette). In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/504012018002/consolide [Accessed 7 June 2018].
[29] Marshall, A.  and Davies,  A.  (2018)  Waymo's  Self-Driving  Car  Crash  in Arizona  Revives
Tough Questions.  [online] Wired. Available from: https://www.wired.com/story/waymo-
crash-self-driving-google-arizona/ [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[30] Naughton,  K.  (2017)  Ford's  Dozing  Engineers  Side  with  Google  in Full  Autonomy  Push.
[online] Bloomberg. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-
17/ford-s-dozing-engineers-side-with-google-in-full-autonomy-push  [Accessed  30  May
2018].
[31] Nicola, S., Behrmann, E. and Mawad, M. (2018) It's a Good Thing Europe's Autonomous Car
Testing Is Slow. [online] Bloomberg. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-03-20/it-s-a-good-thing-europe-s-autonomous-car-testing-is-slow  [Accessed
30 May 2018].
[32] Säcker, F. J., Rixecker, R. and Oetker, H. (2012) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch. Band 2. Schuldrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. 6th edition. München: Verlag C. H. Beck.
[33] SAE International.  (2014) J3016.  Taxonomy and Definitions  for  Terms Related to On-Road
Motor Vehicle  Automated  Driving  Systems.  Available  from:  https://web.archive.org/web/
20170903105244/https://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf
[Accessed 30 May 2018].
[34] Smith, B. W. (2013) SAE Levels of Driving Automation. [blog entry] 18 December. Available
from: http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/sae-levels-driving-automation
[Accessed 30 May 2018].
[35] Sterling,  L.  and  Taveter,  K.  (2009) The Art  of Agent-Oriented  Modeling. Cambridge:
The MIT Press.
[36] Russell, S. J. and Norvig, P. (1995)  Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. New Jersey:
Prentice Hall.
[37] Strassenverkehrsgesetz (StVG) (Road Traffic Act) 2003. SI 2003/310, 919. In German.
[38] Tampuu, T. (2017) Lepinguvälised võlasuhted (Non-contractual obligations). Tallinn: Juura.
2018] T. Liivak, J. Lahe: Delictual Liability for Damage ... 73
[39] Traffic  Act  (liiklusseadus) 2010.  SI  2010/44,  261.  Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja  (State  Gazette).
In Estonian. English translation available from: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/5211220
17002/consolide [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[40] Varul, P. et al. (2009) Võlaõigusseadus III. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations Act.
Commented Edition. Vol. III). Tallinn: Juura.
[41] Vladeck,  D.  C.  (2014)  Machines  without  Principals:  Liability  Rules  and  Artificial
Intelligence.  Washington Law Review,  89 (1),  pp. 117−150. Available from: http://digital.
law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1322/89WLR0117.pdf?
sequence=1 [Accessed 30 May 2018].
[42] Volker,  M.,  Jänich,  P.  T.  and  Schrader,  V.  R.  (2015)  Rechtsprobleme des  autonomen
Fahrens. Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, 28(7), pp. 313−318.
[43] von  Bar,  C.  (2009)  Principles  of European  Law:  Non-Contractual  Liability  Arising  out
of Damage Caused to Another. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers.
[44] Weber,  P.  (2016)  Dilemmasituationen  beim  autonomen  Fahren.  Neue  Zeitschrift  für
Verkehrsrecht, (6), pp. 249−254.
[45] Weise, E. and Marsh, A. (2018)  Video Shows Google Self-Driving Van Accident in Arizona.
[online] USA Today, 5 May. Available from: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/05/
04/google-self-driving-van-involved-crash-arizona-driver-injured/582446002/  [Accessed
30 May 2018].
